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(Kent) Jackson v. Commonwealth
587 S.E.2d 532 (Va. 2003)
L Fa
On April 18, 2000, Beulah Mae Kaiser's ("Kaiser") body was found in her
ransacked apartment with extensive injuries, any number of which could have
been fatal. Law enforcement was unable to find a weapon or anyfingerprints to
aid in identifying the attacker. However, sixteen months later, DNA testing
revealed a match between saliva on a cigarette butt found at the scene of the
crime and CaryGaskins ("Gaskins"). The police, acting on information provided
by Gaskins, interviewed Joseph M. Dorsett ("Dorsett"). Dorsett was Kent
Jermaine Jackson's ("Jackson") roommate in the apartment adjacent to Mrs.
Kaiser at the time of the crime. After the interview, both Dorsett and Jackson
were arrested for the murder of Mrs. Kaiser. Upon his arrest, Jackson confessed
to the killing.'
In January of 2002, a grand jury indictment was issued against Jackson for,
inter alia, the capital murder of Kaiser in the commission of a robbery or attempted robbery and object sexual penetration.2 Jackson made several pre-trial
motions, including a request for a change of venue, suppression of his confession, a bill of particulars, and additional peremptory strikes.' The trial court
denied Jackson's motions and rejected his challenge to the constitutionality of
Virginia's capital murder statutes.' Jackson was found guiltyof all charges except
1. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 587 S.E.2d 532, 537-38 (Va. 2003). The medical examiner
reported that the seventy-nine-year-old "Mrs. Kaiser died from a combination of a stab wound to
her jugular vein, a fractured skull, and asphyxia caused by blockage of her airway by her tongue.
Any one of these injuries could have been fatal" Id at 537. Mrs. Kaiser also had "two black eyes,
a broken nose, and multiple abrasions, lacerations, and bruises. She had five stab wounds to her
head and neck, including the wound to her jugular vein." Id In addition, "Mrs. Kaiser had been
anallysodomized with her walking cane and ... the cane then had been driven into her mouth with
such violence that it knocked out most of her teeth, tore her tongue and forced it into her airway,
fractured her jaw, and penetrated ... her face." Id Blood splatters were found throughout Mrs.
Kaiser's apartment. Id
2. Id at 538; see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Michie Supp. 2003) (providing the definition
of capital murder); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.2 (ichie Sup 2003) (providing the definition of
object sexual penetration). Jackson was also charged with robbery, felony stabbing, and statutory
burglary. Jadeson,587 S.E.2d at 538; sw VA. CODE ANN. 18.2-58 (ichie Supp. 2003) (providing
the statutory definition for robbery; VA. CODE ANN. 5 18.2-53 (Mlchie 1996) (providing the
statutorydefinition for felonystabbing); VA. CODE ANN. 518.2-90 (Michie Supp. 2003) (providing
the statutory definition for burglary).
3. Jadesm, 587 S.E.2d at 538.
4. Id
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object sexual penetration.' At sentencing, the jury found the statutory aggravating factor of vileness and recommended a sentence of death for the capital
murder of Kaiser.6 The trial court, after reviewing the pre-sentence report,
additional mitigating evidence presented byJackson, and arguments of counsel,
adopted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Jackson to death.' The
Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated the statutory automatic death sentence
review, Jackson's appeal of the capital murder conviction, and Jackson's appeal
of his noncapital convictions.!
I. Hddm
The Supreme Court of Virginia first held that Ridwrdsonv UnitaiSat 9 does
not require a jury to specifythe element or elements of the vileness aggravating
factor upon which its decision was based."0 Second, the court found that the trial
court properly allowed the prosecution to cross-examine the defense DNA
expert regarding his refusal to meet with his prosecution counterpart." Third,
the court held that the trial court properly excluded testimony offered by Jack5.

Id

6. Id The jury recommended life imprisonment plus twenty-five years and a$100,000 fine
for the remaining noncapital offenses. Id

7.

Id

8. Id; swVA. CODE ANN. 5 17.1-313 (Michie Supp. 2003) (providing the procedures for the
mandatory review of death sentences in Virginia). Jackson raised fifteen claims on appeal to the
Supreme Court of Virginia. Jadeson,587 S.E.2d at 538. The court rejected four of Jackson's claims
on the ground that they were previously decided and rejected another three claims on the ground
that they were procedurallydefaulted at trial. Id Jackson raised several other claims as follows: (1)
his rights under Mirardav A rizoma, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966), were violated when the trial court
refused to suppress his confession; (2)the trial court erred in not disqualifying ajuror tainted by
newspaper accounts of the case; (3) jurors were improperly challenged based on their race in
violation of Basnv Kmewky, 476 U.S. 79,89 (1986); (4)the trial court erred in not allowingJackson
to present " 'negative evidence' of good character"; and (5) the jury's verdict was the result of
passion, prejudice, or some other arbitrary factor and the sentence of death was disproportionate
when compared with similar cases. Id at 538-46. All of these claims were rejected bythe Supreme
Court of Virginia and will not be further discussed in this case note. For a discussion and analysis
of the issues surrounding aBatson challenge, swnruyPriyaNath, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 407
(2003) (analyzing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029 (2003)). For a discussion of the Supreme
Court of Virginia's proportionalityreview procedures, seegvdayMaxwell C Smith, Case Note, 16
CAP. DEF.J. 533 (2004) (analyzing Gerry) Jackson v. Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 520 (Va. 2004));
Terrence T. Egland, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 591 (2004) (analyzing Powell v. Commonwealth,
590 S.E.2d 537 (Va. 2004)); and Jessie A. Seiden, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF. J.625 (2004) (analyzing
Palmer v. Clarke, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (D. Neb. 2003)).
9. 526 U.S. 813 (1999).
10. Jadkson, 587 S.E.2d at 541; seeRichardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 819-20 (1999)
(holding that the violations required for conviction of participating in a continuing criminal
enterprise were elements of the crime upon which the jurymust agree).
11. Jadeson, 587 S.E.2d at 543.
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son's expert witness concerning "false confessions."12 Finally, the court rejected
Jackson's claim that the evidence was insufficient to convict him. 3 The court
affirmed Jackson's conviction of capital murder and his sentence of death. 4
III A nlsis
A. JyPlling
Jackson claimed that the trial court erred in denying his pre-trial motion to
have the jurypolled to identify"which statutoryelement(s) established vileness,"
whether it be torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery." Jackson argued
that the trial court should have allowed jury instructions and a verdict form that
required the jury to reach a unanimous verdict on one or more of the statutory
vileness elements.16 Jackson relied on Ridardson, arguing that when death is
imposed, due process requires unanimity as to the statutory elements of the
aggravating factor of vileness. 7
The Jackson court found that in Qak v Cbnvm adth the Supreme Court
of Virginia "rejected the proposition that the jury must identify the element or
elements of the vileness factor upon which it based its decision."19 The Jackson
court noted that "Ridrtsoninvolved a prosecution for engaging in a continuing
criminal enterprise" and that the Ridmndson Court distinguished between its
holding and a case in which "the jurymust unanimously find force as an element
of the crime of robbery, but whether the force is created by the use of a gun or
a knife is not an element of the crime and therefore does not require juryunanimity."2 ° The Jacksoncourt found that torture, depravity of mind, and aggravated
batterywere not elements of the vileness aggravating factor, but rather" 'several
12.

Id at 544.

13.

Id at 545.

14.

15.

Id at 546.
Id at 541 (internal quotation marks omitted).

16.

Id; se VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2000) (providing that adefendant shall not

be sentenced to death unless the jury finds that "his conduct in committing the offense for which

he stands charged was outrageouslyor wantonlyvile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture,

depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim").
17. Jadeso ,587 S.E.2d at 541; seeVA.CODE ANN. §19.2-264.2 (providing for the juryto find

that an offense "involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery" in order to find the
vileness predicate satisfied); Riawr4sn, 526 U.S. at 819-20 (holding that all violations constituting

a charge of a continuing criminal enterprise were elements of the offense that must be agreed upon
by the jury).
18.
19.

257 S.E.2d 784 (Va. 1979).
Ja&sn,587 S.E.2d at 541; see
Clark v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 784, 792 (Va. 1979)

(holding that juryunanimity as to sentence is required, but reiterating "that a juryneed not specify
which portion of the factor it finds inorder to fulfill the requirement that a verdict be unanimous").
20. Jadkson, 587 S.E.2d at 541 (citing Ridiaun, 526 U.S. at 817).
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possible sets of underlying facts [that] make up [the] particular element."' 21 The
Jadksoncourt further found that the actual element the jury was required to find
unanimously was the aggravating factor of vileness, which required a showing
that Jackson's actions were " 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman.' "22 The Jadesoncourt concluded that the holding in C/a'k was unaffected
by Ridnson and that jury unanimity as to the torture, depravity of mind, or
aggravated battery subelements in section 19.2-264.2 was not required. 3
B. Issues InigExpets

1. Failueto Caoperate
Jackson claimed that the trial court erred when it allowed the prosecution
to cross-examine his DNA expert, Sean Weiss ("Weiss"), concerning his refusal
to meet with the prosecution's DNA expert.24 Jackson's expert questioned the
DNA test results presented by the prosecution; however, Weiss conducted no
independent tests of his own to refute the prosecution expert's findings. 5
During the disputed cross-examination, Weiss revealed that the Commonwealth
asked him to meet with its DNA expert to discuss the DNA test results, but that
he refused because "he was 'under the direction of the person that hired
[him].'"26 The Commonwealth asked Weiss if he knew that the Commonwealth
2
had "just opened everything up, showed it, no requests having been made.
Jackson objected at that point and the trial court overruled his objection.
Jackson argued that the Commonwealth's questioning was misleading to the
jurybecause "it implied that Jackson did not adhere to the rules of discovery."29
The Commonwealth responded that it was showing Weiss's lack of "credibility,
potential bias and the basis of his opinions."" The court found that under Gri.
v Cathwmadd, 31 the bias of a witness "based on a relationship to a party in the
case" is a proper subject for cross-examination and the decision to limit such

21.
22.
23.

Id (alteration in original (quoting Rzkdm, 526 U.S. at 817).

24.

Id at 543.

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id
Jadesn, 587 S.E.2d at 543.
Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id

29.

Id Jackson also argued that the questions violated his due process rights; however, the

Id (quoting VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2).
Id

Supreme Court of Virginia refused to consider that argument because Jackson did not make it at
trial. Id at 543 n.3 (citing VA. SUP. Cr. R. 5:25).
30. Id
31.
470 S.E.2d 114 (Va. 1996).
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cross-examination is left to the trial court's discretion.32 The court found that
Weiss's refusal to meet with the prosecution's DNA experts, due to his relationship with the defense, "could have reflected bias."33 The court concluded that
the trial court did not err in overruling Jackson's objection.3 4
2. Expert Tesdnzy on FalseCbrfasim
Jackson argued that the trial court erred in refusing to allowJackson to ask
his expert witness, Dr. Steven C Ganderson ("Dr. Ganderson")," 'a hypothetical
question about false confessions.' "" The court relied on Pndxt v
OzntnrwwIW 6 for the proposition that expert witnesses may state opinions
concerning the hypothetical effects of a defendant's mental disorder on his

confession, but that the witness may not state an opinion on a particular defendan's "veracity or reliability" because that is a matter left to the jury to determine.37 Dr. Ganderson testified about "transference," in which a person succumbs to the power of suggestion and "may say things which are untrue in an
attempt to gain approval from an authority figure." 38 The trial court allowed
Jackson's trial counsel to question Dr. Ganderson on the theory of transference.39 The Commonwealth objected, however, when Jackson attempted to
ascertain Dr. Ganderson's opinion concerning the veracityof Jackson's confession in light of transference theory, and the trial court sustained the objection.4"
The Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the trial court properly relied on
Pritktt
in sustaining the Commonwealth's objection to Dr. Ganderson's testi41
mony.

32. Jadksa, 587 S.E.2d at 543; see
Goins v. Commonweakh, 470 S.E.2d 114, 129 (Va. 1996)
(-'Tbe bias of a witness, based on a previous relationship with apartyto the case, isalways a relevant
subject of cross-examination."); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Sonney, 374 S.E.2d 71, 74 (Va. 1988)
("The bias of a witness is always a relevant subject of inquiry when confined to ascertaining
previous relationship, feeling and conduct of the witness.").
33. Jacksom 587 S.E2d at 543.
34. Id
35. Id at 543-44.
36. 557 SE.2d 205 (Va. 2002).
37. Jadeson,587S.E.2d at 544;swPritchett v. Commonwealth, 557 SIE.2d 205,208 (Va. 2002)
("An expert witness may not express an opinion as to the veracity of a witness because such
testimony improperlyinvades the province of the jury to determine the reliability of a witness.").
38. Jdksm4, 587 S.E.2d at 544.
39.
Id
40.
41.

Id
Id

CAPITAL DEFENSEJOURNAL

[Vol. 16:2

3. Main to Strike
Jackson claimed that the trial court improperly denied his motion to strike
the prosecution's evidence.42 In particular, Jackson argued that the evidence
presented by the Commonwealth was insufficient to support his conviction for
three reasons: (1) "his confession was not reliable"; (2)the forensic testing on
the cigarette butt was inadequate; and (3) there was no other evidence that
connected Jackson to the crime scene.43 Jackson cited two reasons why his
confession was not reliable."' Jackson argued that "his will was overborne bythe
deception of the officers" and that he gave afalse confession.4" The court noted
that it had previouslyheld that Jackson's will was not overborne and also found
no evidence to support Jackson's contention that the tactics used bythe officers
were46sufficiently inappropriate to categorize Jackson's confession as involuntary.
Jackson also claimed that the forensic DNA testing used to link him with
the crime was not as accurate as the standard procedure typicallyused at the state
laboratory.4 The test used to link Jackson to the crime utilized only eight loci,
of which Jackson matched six, whereas the usual state laboratory standard
requires the testing of thirteen or sixteen loci.48 Weiss indicated in his testimony
that had the state procedure been used, "there was a 'possibility' that other
suspects mayhave had more loci matches than Jackson."49 The court stated that
"Jackson's criticism of the ommonwealth's forensic testing does not change the
fact that some of the loci matched his DNA."" The court, citing the testimony
of Jackson's own expert, concluded that" 'Kent Jackson [could not] be excluded
as a minor contributor.' "51
The court also rejected Jackson's contention that the lack of forensic
evidence supported the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to convict
2
him.1
The court stated that Jackson's detailed confession was corroborated by
evidence of Kaiser's injuries and was, therefore, sufficient to enable the jury to
42. Id at 545.
43. Id
44. Jackson, 587 S.E.2d at 545.
45. Id
46. Id The court rejected Jackson's argument that the interrogating officers overwhelmed
his will and induced him to confess. Id at 540-41.
47.
48.

Id at 545.
Id Blood from the toe of a sock found at the crime scene was used to connect Jackson

to the crime. Id
49. Id
50. Jakso, 587 S.E.2d at 545.
51. Id
52. Id
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find Jackson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." The court concluded that the
trial court properly denied Jackson's motion to strike.14
IV. Applicationm V iTga
A. Viless Pmd eas anElrwntt
The Jackson court rejected the proposition that Ridhndson requires jury
unanimity on the sub-elements of the vileness aggravator; however, Jackson
could have made the argument for unanimity differently and, perhaps, with
greater success."5 The Court in Ridunrson held that the jury must be instructed
to reach a unanimous verdict concerning each individual violation comprising the
series of violations needed to prove a continuing criminal enterprise under
federal law."' Ridxnron is a federal statutory construction case rather than a
constitutional case. The Richandson Court, however, noted that its construction
of the federal statute avoided a constitutional issue that would have been presented bythe opposite construction."
Ridramion stands together with J]w u Uied Statz.58 In Jone, the Court
addressed whether a statutory factor in the federal carjacking statute, "serious
bodilyinjury," which increased the penalty, was to be decided bythe jurybeyond
a reasonable doubt or by the judge by a preponderance of the evidence. 9 The
Court, again construing a federal statute, held that the factor was an element to
be determined by the jury and again concluded that the opposite construction
would raise constitutional questions.6"
The Court constitutionalizedJ]0r inAppmri v Newjeey,6 1 which held that
any factor that places the defendant at risk of a higher maximum sentence must,
consistent with the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee and Fourteenth
53. Id; sie (1ozza v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 273, 279 (Va. 1984) ("When ... the
commission of the crime has been fullyconfessed bythe accused, onlyslight corroborative evidence
is necessaryto establish the corpus delicti.").
54. Jadesn, 587 S.E.2d at 545.
55. Id at 541.
56. Ridvzarn, 526 U.S. at 824; see2l U.S.C S848(c) (2000) (defining a "continuing criminal
enterprise").

57. Ridkx a, 526 U.S. at 820.
58.
SwJones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 229 (1999) (holding that a federal carjacking
statute defined three separate offenses rather than one "crime with a choice of three maximum
penalties"); 18 U.S.C § 2119 (2000) (defining and providing punishment for carjacking).
59. Jam, 526 U.S. at 231, 252; see 18 U.S.C § 2119 (2000) (defining and providing punishmert for carjacking).
60. loni, 526 U.S. at 252 (holding that constitutional questions can be avoided "byconstruing
S 2119 as establishing three separate offenses bythe specification of distinct elements, each of which
must be charged by indictment, proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its
verdict").
61. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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Amendment due process, be found beyond a reasonable doubt bya unanimous
jury.62

The Court specifically extended Apprvrii to capital cases in Rin v
A izom,6 which held that "[c]apital defendants ... are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment."6 4
Jones, Appnrni, and Riag stand for a simple proposition- a factor that
increases the maximum penalty is an element of the more serious offense.
Appm"ri and Rigstate the constitutional imperative that flows from that proposition, that the State must prove that element beyond a reasonable doubt to a
unanimous jury." In effect, there is no longer a constitutional difference between penalty-determination devices "whether the statute calls them elements of
the offense, sentencing factors, or MaryJane." 6 After these cases, a defendant
prosecuted under a state statute like the federal one in Ridiamrson would be
constitutionally entitled to a jury determination of the violations making up the
series. Conversely, a robberydefendant would not be constitutionallyentitled to
a jury determination of the "brute facts," such as whether the use of a knife or
gun satisfied the force/intimidation element of robbery.6
The RidiAnson Court set out two considerations to distinguish "elements"
from "brute facts"- the language and the breadth/unfairness of the statute.68
The Court decided that the word "violation" in the continuing criminal enterprise
statute implied more than a simple act or conduct; it implied an act or conduct
that violates the law.69 Further, the Court noted that a jury traditionally determines whether an act or conduct violates the law.7" The broad range of possible
violations that could be used to satisfy the statute concerned the Court in two
ways: (1) it could cover up a wide range of disagreement among the jurors about

62.
Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466,476 (2000) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the extension of the Jor rationale to state statutes).
63. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
64. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002).
65. AppnnA 530 US. at 476 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that" 'any
fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged
in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt' " by the State
(quotingr
Ja, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6)); Rr 536 U.S. at 589 (Capital defendants ...are entitled to
a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum
punishment.").
66. Ri, 536 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
67. Ridiron,526 U.S. at 817.
68.
d at 818-20.
69. Id at 818;see21 U.S.C. S 848(c) (2000) (stating that "aperson is engaged in a continuing
criminal enterprise if... he violates any provision of this subchapter. . .and... such violation is
a part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter").
70. Rihvalsco 526 U.S. at 818.
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what the defendant did or did not do; and (2)by avoiding detail the jury might
decide that smoke equals fire.7'
In light of Rbr Apprndi,Jones, and Ridardson,the Virginia vileness factors
should be considered elements to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The
first factor is "torture." Torture is "[tjhe infliction of intense pain to the body
or mind to punish ... or to obtain sadistic pleasure."" There are two components to this definition- act and mental state. The act is infliction of pain; the
mental state is the actor's purpose. Thus, "torture" is defined precisely as a
crime- a "violation"- is. It is defined byaaw m&and nvs a. In a torture
case, the Commonwealth might present evidence that the victim was burned with
cigarettes and had several bones broken. These are the brute facts from which
the jury, some relying on the buns and others on the broken bones, could find
the aawis nuw- infliction of pain- and from that infer the rn na- for sadistic
pleasure. 3 Ajurydeciding whether the defendant tortured his victim is performing the quintessential juryguilt/innocence function. It is assessing the brute facts
to determine if the defendant did the forbidden acts with the requisite state of
mind.
The second factor is "depravity of mind." Depravity of mind is "a degree
of moral turpitude and psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in the
definition of ordinary legal malice and premeditation." 4 Juries regularly determine malice and premeditation and do so by examining all of the "brute facts"
and deciding whether those facts dictate a conclusion that the defendant must
have acted with malice and/or premeditation. In a depravity-of-mind case
involving a rape and murder, the Commonwealth might present evidence that the
defendant had written out his plan to abduct, torment, rape, and kill the victim
and that he gathered items (rope, duct tape, handcuffs) with which to accomplish
his crimes. There are brute facts from which the jury, some relying on the plan
and others on the "rape kit," could infer that the defendant's mental state
surpassed ordinary premeditation. This jury is performing the quintessential
guilt/innocence jury function. It is assessing the brute facts to determine if the
defendant's mental state meets a legal standard.
The third factor is "aggravated battery." Aggravated battery is "a battery
which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable than the minimum
necessaryto accomplish an act of murder."75 Aggravated battery bears the same
relation to battery as aggravated sexual battery bears to sexual battery.7 6 A jury
71. Id at 819.
72. BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1498 (7th ed. 1999).
73. To the extent "for sadistic pleasure" might be described as motive rather than intent, the
distinction is constituonallyirrelevant. Appnni 530 U.S. at 491-94.
74. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.Eld 135, 149 (Va. 1978).

75.

Id

76.

SwVA. CODE ANN. S 18.2- 67.3 (Mlfchie Supp. 2003) (defining aggravated sexual battery);
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deciding whether the battery that caused death is an aggravated battery is performing the same task as that performed by a jury deciding whether a sexual
battery is an aggravated sexual battery. In the latter case, the jury must decide
whether the defendant's conduct met the legal standards set out in section 18.267.3 of the Virginia Code. 77 For example, the Commonwealth might present
evidence that the defendant threatened to shoot and stab the victim. The jury,
some relying on one threat and some on the other, could find that the defendant
"threatene[d] to use a dangerous weapon" and convict him of aggravated sexual
battery.78 In an aggravated battery case, the Commonwealth might present
evidence that the victim suffered multiple blows to the head and was shot several
times. These are the brute facts from which the jury, some relying on the blows
and others on the gunshots, must determine the legal fact- whether the battery
was qualitatively and quantitatively more culpable than ordinary death-dealing
batteries. This jurywill be performing the quintessential guilt/innocence function; it will be deciding whether the defendant committed the more serious or
less serious form of battery.
In each instance, the jurydetermining a vileness factor will be doing exactly
what a federal jury must do in determining the existence of a "violation." Each
of the vileness factors, therefore, is an element and the jury must unanimously
find the vileness elements. In addition, the breadth of the vileness factors is at
least as great as the "violation" in Rihandson. The Ridanson Court identified
ninety federal statutes that included qualifying violations. But, at the very least,
there was a precise statutory definition for each of those violations.
The vileness factors, even as restated in Srith, are entirely open-ended.
They invite the jury to decide that the case is an "awful" one and find vileness
without textual regard to any of the three vileness factors. Such a decision, of
course, is a direct violation of all constitutional death penalty jurisprudence since
Fumzn v Georgia To ensure constitutional reliabilityin the sentencing process,
the jury must be required to find unanimously the vileness elements.

VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-67.4 (Michie Supp. 2003) (defining sexual battery).
77. Sw VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.3 (defining aggravated sexual batter).
78. SwVA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.3(A)(2)(c) ("An accused shall be guiltyof aggravated sexual
batteryif he or she sexually abuses the complaining witness, and... (t]he act is accomplished against
the will of the complaining witness, by force, threat or intimidation... and... [t]he accused uses
or threatens to use a dangerous weapon.").
79.

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam) (holding the Georgia death

penalty statutory scheme unconstitutional); sw Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976) (holding that processes in capital cases must provide greater sentencing reliability than that
acceptable in non-capital cases); se also Hill v. Commonwealth, 568 S.E.2d 673, 676 (Va. 2002)

(holding that in non-capital cases "neither the defendant nor the Commonwealth has a constitutional or statutory right to question a jury panel about the range of punishment that may be
imposed upon the defendant," although such questioning is allowed in capital cases).
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B. Bias Ba onPorRdatiolhp
TheJadesoncourt found the cases of Gbtz and Norfdk & WestemRailewy Ca
v Son qF ° analogous to the situation presented by the cross-examination of the
defense DNA expert, Weiss.81 However, these cases are not clearlyapplicable to
Jackson's circumstances and most likely could have been distinguished. In both
GCo and Norfdk & WtemRai/wtyCa, the trial court allowed cross-examination
to prove that a witness was biased because of apntia& relationship with either
of the litigating parties.82 In Jadeso, the court appointed Weiss as the defense
DNA expert duringtrial. Clearly, any bias towards the defense occurred after the
trial began and could not be viewed as a previous relationship for purposes of
Gouz and Norfd/k & WestemRai/wy Co. The Supreme Court of Virginia declined
to state the "previous" element of the relationship when restating the rule from
Grs and, thus, found that Weiss's refusal to meet with the Commonwealth's
expert based on the defense's instruction was sufficient to warrant an exploration
of his credibility based on the relationship.83 Defense counsel should be aware
of how to distinguish the cases relied on for allowing cross-examination in this
case in order to make an effective objection.
C Proper Fom dation cfa Pritchett Hypodxtiad Q~tim
The Jadeson court cited Pitdxu in excluding Dr. Ganderson's testimony in
response to a hypothetical question concerning the reliability of Jackson's
confession. 4 Pritdett held that the exclusion of expert testimony concerning
Pritchett's low I.Q. and the correlation between alow I.Q. and false confessions
because of compliance and interrogative suggestibilitywas reversible error." The
Pritdttcourt found that voluntariness of a confession is to be determined bythe
trial court, whereas the reliability of a confession is to be determined by the
86
jury.
Pfitdm prohibits testimonybyan expert about the veracityof a particular
defendant's confession in light of a particular affliction but not testimony about

80.
81.

374 S.E.2d 71 (Va. 1988).
Jadesotn
587 S.E.2d at 543; see
Goim, 470 S.E.2d at 129 ("The bias of a witness, based on
a pwzua relationship with a party to the case, is always a relevant subject of cross-examination."
(emphasis added)); Nofc & W Ry Ca, 374 S.E.2d at 74 ("The bias of a witness is always a
relevant subject of inquiry when confined to ascertaining pia relationship, feeling and conduct
of the witness." (emphasis added)).
82. SamGbim, 470 S.E.2d at 129 (allowing cross-examination of witness to reveal a prior
business relationship with the defendant); Norfdk & W Ry Ca, 374 S.E.2d at 74 (allowing crossexamination of an expert medical witness that had treated plaintiff's attorney's clients previously).
83. Jadesot; 587 S.2d at 543.

84.
85.
86.

Id at 544.
Pt 557 S.E.2d at 206-08.
Id at 208 (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 688 (1986)).
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the reliability of confessions given by defendants with similar afflictions. 7 In
order for defense counsel to elicit the appropriate response to a hypothetical
question concerning the reliability of a confession, several steps must be taken
prior to asking the ultimate question: (1)the condition that rendered the confession unreliable, such as mental retardation, must be identified; (2) the effects of
the condition must be established; (3) it must be concluded that the defendant
has the condition in question; and (4) a hypothetical question must be posed that
carefully draws out the correlation between the condition and a propensity to
give false confessions.
Injadeson'scase, step one was accomplished when Dr. Ganderson testified
about "transference" theory leading to Jackson's false confession.88 Dr.
Ganderson properly testified as to its effects generally, such as rendering a
subject more prone to suggestion in order to gain approval from the interrogator,
which satisfied step two. However, he did not offer testimony concerning
Jackson's reasons for being susceptible to transference." In order to make the
logical step of understanding how susceptibility to transference leads to false
confessions, the jury would have needed more evidence in terms of an actual
condition rendering Jackson susceptible. Evidence of a lowI.Q., mental retardation, or other psychological problems would have bolstered the third step in the
Pri
analysis.
If it is assumed that the third step was satisfied and it was established that
Jackson was susceptible to transference, then the fourth step must be approached
with care. InJakson,the hypothetical question would have been allowed had it
been phrased in a manner that did not require an assessment byDr. Ganderson
of Jackson's veracity. Dr. Ganderson could have responded to a question that
inquired about how a person with Jackson's affliction would react to interrogative questions but not to a question concerning Dr. Ganderson's opinion of
Jackson's veracity in light of transference theory. A simple change in phrasing
can salvage otherwise inadmissible testimony.
V. CQwkioon
Jaksonrejected the rationale in Ridandon; continued the holding in Clak,
and refused to require unanimity as to the vileness elements of section 19.2264.2." However, combining Ridumkson with the holdings injoe, Appmmn and
87.

Id

88.
89.

Jadcsom, 587 S.E.2d at 544.
Id
Id

90.

91. SeeVA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2000) (providing that a defendant shall not be
sentenced to death unless the jury finds that "his conduct in committing the offense for which he
stands charged was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim").
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Rug should yield the opposite result. Jadeson also illustrates the importance of
mastering the common law evidence rules in Virginia to avoid the impeachment
of favorable witnesses. FinallyJaksnhighlights the importance of the appropriate phrasing of a question concerning the reliability of confessions in light of the
holding in PrithMt.
Terrence T. Egland

